Source: gallup.com

Gallup reported this morning that Obama’s ratings are historically polarized. In the 60 years gallup has measured presidents’ approval and disapproval, Obama has received consistently higher approval from Democrats and consistently higher disapproval from Republicans over the course of his presidency.

Source: gallup.com

A couple things about these figures. First, when you ask a question with only three available responses (approve, disapprove, and don’t know/no opinion), you tend to find more polarization than there actually is. There is a whole range from somewhat approve to somewhat disapprove that isn’t captured. Second, it’s more likely the fault of the political environment than Obama alone. As the article reports, polarization on presidential approval goes back to at least Reagan (though H.W. Bush approval wasn’t as polarized). And third, the drop in partisan identification in recent years we may have an affect on the trend. As more “moderate” identifiers become independents, a greater concetration of ideologically extreme individuals may influence the numbers. Regardless, more evidence for the media’s polarization frenzy.

In Gingrich’s infamous exchange with John King–a debate I attended–he noted:

I think the disruptive, vicious, negative nature of the news media makes it harder to govern this country.

Some political scientists would agree.  Empirical research has shown, for example, that people select news outlets that confirm their ideological viewpoints (contributing to polarization) and that uncivil news programs lead to less trust in government.  So in this way, Gingrich is probably right.

Students of Congress, however, will find Gingrich’s statement, let’s say, “unusual” (some would say hypocritical).  In 1970 Congress passed the Legislative Reorganization Act which, among other legislative changes, authorized television broadcasts inside the House of Representatives.  In 1979 the newly created Cable-Satellite Public Affairs Network (C-SPAN) began live, gavel-to-gavel coverage of all floor proceedings.  Yay for transparency!  But in 1983 and 1984 a funny (yet predictable) thing happened: members of the newly formed Conservative Opportunity Society, a group founded by Newt Gingrich, began using C-SPAN as a vehicle to politicize the House’s proceedings and embarrass the Democratic majority. You can see elements of the Gingrich/COS strategy today.  Turn on C-SPAN late in the evening and you will see a close-in shot of some representatives addressing the House (see the picture above, for example).  During this time–known as “special orders”–the House has completed it’s daily business, yet members are still permitted speaking time (and the cameras are rolling).  Unbeknownst to viewers, however, the House chamber is usually empty.  Upset with how Gingrich and his conservative allies were using C-SPAN, then Speaker Tip O’Neil ordered the camera operator to pan the chamber.  By taking the camera shot off the individual, it was revealed that the speaker (in this case Robert Walker, R-PA) was in an empty room (see the picture to the left).  The event spawned a partisan battle and became known as “camscam” (“camgate” was apparently taken).

Perhaps it goes without saying, but the point is that when Gingrich rails against the “negative nature” of the media because it makes our nation “harder to govern,” it’s not that he’s neccessasrcy wrong, just that this is a pot-meet-kettle situation.  One familiar with Gingrich’s past, particularly his role as a partisan insurgent in the House from 1983 to 1994, cannot help but roll their eyes.  He is, after all, a master of the adversarial media (not just a victim).

edit: Jonathan Bernstein has a nice post questioning Gingrich’s similarity outrageous statement that he “voluntarily” left the House for the good of the Republican Party.

The special election is sure to receive significant media attention.  As a rule, special elections are over-analyzed by the press:  the dictum often seems to be “All politics is local, unless it’s a special election.  In that case, it’s a referendum on the President.”  Remember all the lessons we learned in the 2009 NY-23 election?  Neither do I.   But that’s not going to stop the torrent of coverage as the media tries to figure out who is going to win the presidential race based on the special election results in June.  Of course, the media coverage would be high anyway given the horrific shooting last year.  Right now, in some undisclosed location, CNN’s Best Political Team on TV is getting prepared for a full scale deployment to Arizona.

We’ll set aside for a later day just how consequential the special elections are going to be on a national level (hint: according to Gaddie, Bullock and Buchanan, [gated] not much), and focus for now on what we should expect the special election to look like.

First, a quick primer on special elections, courtesy of Monkey Cage co-founder Lee Sigelman’s 1981 LSQ article [gated].

1) Special elections turnout is really low – about 50% less than off-year general election turnout.  [For context, off year general election turnout generally hovers around 35-40% of the eligible voting public.  So turnout in the special election is expected to be really, really low.]

->The takeaway point: What is effect of low turnout on the outcome?  Surprisingly, pretty negligible.

2) Special election outcomes are more competitive that the preceding general election.

-> Takeaway point: Given that Giffords won by a margin of only 1.5% in 2010, that means we’re looking at what could be a really close race.

3) In the majority of the special elections, House seats remain in the control of the party that already holds them.  But, when the control changes, the president’s party generally loses.

-> Takeaway point: The Democrats have some advantage heading in to the election given that it’s been a Democratic seat since 2006, but Obama’s low popularity is cause for concern.

4) The party that wins the special election almost always (96% of the time) retains control of the seat in the subsequent general election.

-> Takeaway point: Both parties should really throw their weight into this special election.  The winner of the special election will have the advantage in name recognition and campaign contributions heading in to November.

What looks good for the Republicans?

1) Republican presidential candidates have carried Arizona’s 8th District in each of the three elections (Bush ’00 had a margin of +2 pts, ’04 by +7 pts, McCain ’08 by +6 pts).  Although the GOP presidential candidates haven’t won by much, the fact that it’s a Republican leaning district is certainly good for them.

2) Gabrielle Giffords’ husband, the former Navy captain and astronaut Mark Kelly, will not enter the race.  Though the research focuses on widows, Diane Kincaid [gated] as well as Solowiej and Brunell [gated], find that voters tend to support the relatives of  spouses succeeding their partners into Congress.  Moreover, given his profile as an astronaut, he may have had an advantage over other political amateurs.  The GOP must breathed a sigh of relief when Kelly announced that he will not run.

3) For all intents and purposes, the election has been moved up five months, and this is worse for the Democrats than the Republicans.  The dance card of Republican challengers has already been more or less compiled given that they were already planning on opposing Giffords in November, and the serious candidates had already been preparing for the election.  Moreover, the list of challengers is pretty strong: Jesse Kelly, who narrowly lost to Giffords in 2010 has already filed the paperwork to run again; and state Senator Frank Antenori is also expected to run.

By contrast, the Democrats aren’t nearly as prepared.  The foundations for campaigns take time to establish, and given the truncated timetable, the Democrats are a little behind the eight ball.   When Giffords initially made her decision several days ago, the Democratic party hadn’t yet contacted candidates.   This isn’t a massive setback – there are generally several quality candidates waiting in the wings to succeed a member of Congress – but it’s certainly a disadvantage.

So what’s good for the Democrats?

1) Gabrielle Giffords is still going to play an active role in the campaign.  The candidate who receives her endorsement stands to inherit quite a bit of good will (not to mention campaign contributions).  This is particularly true if the Democrats can coalesce behind one candidate quickly, and use the time the Republicans are duking it out in the primary to help work on building up a general election campaign.

2) The district is going to be re-drawn in 2012, and the new district is widely expected to have more Democrats than it does now.  That is, while the special election will still be in  the current district, the general election will be in the new one.  So even if the Democrats lose in the special election, this could be one of those 4% of elections where the special election result gets overturned in the subsequent general election.  By contrast, if they win in the special election, the prospects of holding on the seat in general election look really good.

So who is going to win?

Way too early to say.  We’ll check back in with a guess on the electoral outcome when the slate of candidates is announced.  At a minimum, this should be interesting, while also presenting a welcome diversion from the glut of news stories on the Republican presidential primary.

Here’s my qualm with the article: generally speaking, why are reformers considered outsiders? We see this a lot in the media. We’re presented with the notion that only outsiders are legitimate reformers. To an extent, they rendered John “Maverick” McCain as an outsider during and following the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act despite nearly 20 years in Washington. In reality, McCain was as inside as it gets. He clearly had strong ties to other members of Congress. He also had the relationships and institutional positioning necessary to get a bill as controversial as BCRA to the floor. And he was willing to exploit these internal channels and relationships to author and pass a significant campaign finance reform bill. But because he worked across party lines and not strictly within his party, he was a “maverick,” to an extent an “outsider,” and otherwise a Senator that went against the grain. Keep in mind he was this “maverick” force in Congress while maintaining a fairly conservative voting record that rose to 90% as judged by the John Birch Society in the fall of 2004.

The point is this: the best reformers are insiders. Outsiders who label themselves reformers often lack the knowledge and experience to significantly affect major problems in Washington. Freshman are effective at lending support, not leading the charge. The members that lead reform movements are most often senior members with the knowledge to pinpoint problems and offer viable policy or procedural solutions. Insiders that sought reform within the institution are the most successful. The most significant reformers in history, members like Mike Monroney (Okla.), Paul Douglas (Ill.), Richard Bolling (Mo.), Robert La Follette Jr. (Wis.), and William Hepburn (Ia.), were all salty veterans when they led the charge. Without the experience they drew upon, both from an institutional and a political standpoint to navigate all the egos and structures in Congress, it is likely that some of Congress’s major rules and ethics reforms never occur.

Take Santorum’s case for example. As a freshman, he and the rest of the “Gang of Seven” brought “Rubbergate” (yet another ‘-gate’ scandal) to the public’s attention. A few changes were made as a result. In reality, however, this wasn’t much of a scandal at all. Members of Congress would over-withdraw their congressional bank accounts that would later be reimbursed with their own paychecks. No tax dollars were used. Norman Ornstein, well-known congressional scholar from American Enterprise Institute, called it “a faux scandal.” It was more much-ado-about-nothing than changing the culture in Congress. In the end, they made a huge deal out of something that wasn’t illegal. Regardless, they pursued this path for political points. And in the process, enraged other senior Republicans who enjoyed the benefits of the Bank. In short, they managed to accomplish an insignificant reform while undermining their opportunity for significant reforms in the future.

If Santorum wanted to be a reformer, in a very real sense, he shouldn’t have alienated senior members who hold the power necessary to enact real change. He had a greater chance of being a legitimate reformer later in his career as he began to make his way up the leadership rungs. While he chose not to pursue significant reforms during this period is unfortunate, but his status as an insider didn’t prohibit reform. It should have enhanced it.

“Look, I like John. He’s a friend, but when you get him talking about government spending multipliers, wow, he can talk for weeks,” said one Democratic member who asked not to be identified. “He drones on and on, and when he’s done, I sometimes have forgotten where I am. He could put Ambien out of business. Let me give you some advice, if you are around John and he starts talking about ‘total change in output as a result of a change in government spending,’ run. Just run. Run as if your life depended on it.”

Awesome!  Hat tip to Matt Caverly for linking to the article.

Christopher Lamb, a colleague of mine at the College of Charleston, writing in yesterday’s Huffington Post, warns Mitt Romney to avoid “going naked to a knife fight.”  This is certainly prescient advice.  In explaining why Mitt Romney should be especially prepared in South Carolina Lamb writes:

To understand politics in South Carolina, one needs to be aware of the quote from the Unionist James Louis Petigru who responded to the state’s decision to secede from the United States in December 1860 by saying, “South Carolina is too small for a republic and too large for an insane asylum.”

As a social scientist, in particular a political scientist, I have an issue with Lamb’s claim. In my mind this quote implies that South Carolina’s politics (particularly it’s primaries) is unusually negative and hyperbolic because it’s people are somehow atypical.  In simple terms, the state’s politics is a function of its 4.7 million citizens.  But while South Carolina is more conservative than most states (and no doubt differs in other ways), I highly doubt its citizenry alone leads to vicious primaries.  In fact, I’m skeptical that the people of South Carolina are even a critical factor in this case.

A political scientist (Lamb is a communications professor)–in particular one approaching this topic from an institutional perspective–might look to other factors.  Specifically, while I think Lamb’s overall point is accurate, what he overlooks in my view is that the primary system itself, and the rules making South Carolina “first in the South,” greatly affect the nature of the state’s primaries.  Because the primary system is an iterated process (rather than a one-shot, 50 state election), political “momentum” is critically important (see this paper by John Aldrich for a formal proof of this dynamic).  Simply put, candidates who win early primaries like Iowa and New Hampshire are likely to receive greater support in subsequent states because of sophisticated or “front runner” voting (see this paper) as well as generate greater campaign donations and support.  This, in turn, improves their chances of winning subsequent primaries.  Because South Carolina is third in this sequence, there is an incentive for opposition candidates to go negative independent of the state’s demographics.

In sum: I don’t think it’s that South Carolina is atypical per se, it’s just the way the primary system is designed and run.

Sarah Binder addressed this topic asking whether the Cordray appointment was “fair” [by which I think she meant “Constitutional”].  Her overall conclusion is that, while this is somewhat uncharted territory from a legal vantage point, there are no firm precedents against its use.  She notes that the Constitution is silent on recess appointments in general and that the Supreme Court declined to address a similar case in 2004.  Binder (aptly in my opinion) describes the White House’s maneuvering for what it is:

an aggressive use of executive power in face of the opposition’s foot-dragging over confirming a nominee to the [Consumer Financial Protection Bureau].

Binder’s claim is in contrast to the public outcry from Boehner, McConnell and company that Obama’s recess appointment represents an unnecessary “power grab.”  But despite the constitutional implications, the Cordray appointment raises a more significant question in my view: How and why Congress evolves in the face of executive encroachment?

In “Congress, the Constitution, and the Crisis of Legitimation,” Larry Dodd—my dissertation advisor and mentor—addressed this topic, arguing that Congress’s “institutional will” vis-à-vis the presidency is conditioned by a range of factors including the political external environment, how lawmakers conceive of their congressional service and long-term cycles of Congressional change.  Of Congress’s lacking institutional will in the 1960s and 1970s, Dodd writes that

In spreading organizational power so widely that Congress cannot act, members undermine not only the legitimacy of the institution but also the popular belief in the viability of Congressional policymaking (p. 413).

Now it’s important to remember that when Dodd was writing (1981), Congress was still highly decentralized despite recent reforms (due in large part to it’s heterogeneous parties and seniority norm).  In the previous decades Congress was marked by significant failings and institutional challenges: in particular the inability to enact civil rights legislation in the 1950s and 60s and Nixon’s impoundment of appropriated funds in the 1970s.

With the Cordray appointment what we see is the opposite problem that Dodd noted: careerist politicians operating in an ideologically polarized and hierarchal environment where party loyalty is critical for a member’s reelection prospects.   This cyclical pattern is something Dodd has also written about in a series of essays—see “Congress and the Question for Power” (1977) and “The Cycles of Legislative Change” (1986).  The gist of the argument is that legislative reforms are driven by the complex interaction of lawmakers’ career goals and the movement of previous generations of reformers through a hierarchical career trajectory.  When junior members occupy Congress during periods of institutional normalcy, power will be decentralized to foster the individual members’ reelection goals.  Over time, however, Congress becomes too rigid and unable to act; as a result the executive branch usurps some area of congressional authority.  The important point is that, like the Cordray appointment and Binder’s point, the executive branch does not usurp congressional prerogatives for the sake of power alone (merely to fill an important void left by Congressional inaction).  According to Dodd’s theory of Congressional cycles, over time this state of affairs leads to greater public dissatisfaction with Congress and an influx of new members tasked with re-centralizing power.  These new members, operating in an environment of Congressional upheaval, are less tied to the existing structure and, therefore, receptive to enacting reforms.

Anyway the point if this post is that (1) the Cordray appointment is due more to Congress’s institutional failings rather than an intentional “power grab” by the president and (2) that previous authors have written about these kinds of developments noting a particular pattern of change over time.

Finally, I would be remiss if I didn’t point out that a number of Dodd’s writings on this topic—including those cited previously—were published a month ago in a single volume.  I encourage anyone interested in Congressional history and institutional development to read “Thinking About Congress: Essays on Congressional Change.”  The reviews of this book—by Sarah Binder, Joseph Cooper, Theodore Lowi, Sean Theriault and Rodney Hero—are quite praiseworthy and impressive.

If you haven’t already read the BE Press Forum on the Senate, it has several very solid articles from multiple leading Senate scholars. If you have the time and interest, I recommend all of them (also, its free).

Jonathan Bernstein has a great take on who decides when congressional recesses occur. Beyond recommending his blog more generally, Bernstein always has excellent analyses on Senate confirmations or, more accurately, the lack thereof.

In a similar vein, Matt Glassman offers some perspective on recess appointments and constitutional powers more generally. It’s a great read and digs a little deeper into the potential historical significance for the separation of powers.

Seth Masket over at Enik Rising challenges Kevin Drum‘s take on the filibuster. Is it at all similar to the pre-Civil War nullifcation crises? He thinks not. I agree though Thomas Mann doesn’t.

Ok, this isn’t about the Senate but over at The Monkey Cage Charles Tien and Michael Lewis-Beck offer their 2012 Election prediction based on consumers’ perceptions of business conditions. I’ve used their analyses as a guide in a couple of my posts but reading the real thing is better. As conditions (read: perceptions) stand right now they predict a narrow victory for Obama in November. Keep in mind, this is before the President’s campaign is in full swing (i.e. relatively little Obama spin on economic numbers compared to the Republicans’ primary campaigns). My guess is that voters’ perceptions will shift in Obama’s favor as his campaign ramps up.

Happy 2012, everyone!

First, let me point out that congressional salaries already put members of Congress in the top 5%. So it’s not surprising to find that so many are well off financially. In fact, it’s been this way since the beginning of the 20^th Century. Matt Glassman wrote a great post about a month ago on the history of congressional pay. In part this is because higher pay insulates members from corruption (at least the really bad kind: Teapot Dome Scandal, etc). A member is less likely to take a bribe if they are making 175k than 50k. Are members paid too much? You can decide that yourself. Just know that with decreased pay comes a higher risk of corruption.

But the more important point is that when averaged in constant dollars congressional pay hasn’t fluctuated all that much. So the notion that today this is somehow a much more relevant factor than usual would have to assume that today’s populist rhetoric plays an important role in Congress’s disapproval. That’s not out of the realm of possibility. However, is it the reason congressional approval is so low? Probably not. There are a multitude of other factors that have a more pressing influence such as gridlock, the success of the 111^th Congress, and intra-Congress conflict (e.g. polarization, caustic political attacks, etc) (Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht 1997, gated), the process of making legislation itself (Hibbing 2001, gated), and not to mention the performance of the economy overall. And since congressional approval has been both high and low despite members’ pay, it probably doesn’t have a huge effect.

The bigger point is the research suggests that congressional approval is not an “out of touch” problem. Rather, it’s an “in touch” problem. It’s easy to point out all the ways that members of Congress are different than the average citizen. However, those differences don’t make Congress unrepresentative. There is a host of research illustrating that voters kick out members that fail to represent their interests. Rather, the problem is that as a collection of 535 different and diverse interests Congress is representing all of those interests so well that there is little to no consensus. In other words, it cannot draft legislation that a majority of members can agree on. This is normally the case when the two chambers are controlled by different parties. However, the rules in each chamber make parties so powerful that it exacerbates this problem. So again, it’s not that Congress is out of touch. Rather, it’s more likely too in-touch with their party and constituents to effectively see past differences to find common ground and legislate; which too his credit, Blake includes in his article. Put simply, people blame Congress for doing its job. Congressional salaries may be icing on the cake, but in large part I doubt it significantly moves the needle if at all.

if the weather is bad and it’s real tough to get out, Ron Paul would win… Ron Paul has an exceptional organization there. And it very well could be that he could end up winning because of the extraordinary devotion of his followers.

That seems plausible.  But is it true?  A 2007 paper by Brad Gomez, Thomas Hansford, and George Krause suggests it is (an ungated version can be found here).  From the abstract of their paper examining the “weather-turnout thesis”:

We argue that much of the intuitive appeal of the [Weather-turnout] thesis results from it comporting well with both socioeconomic status and rational choice models of voter turnout. We also address the theoretical underpinnings of the partisan bias conjecture associated the weather-turnout thesis, which contends that if bad weather does affect voter turnout, the resulting suppression of voters may benefit one party over the other. We examine the effect of weather on voter turnout in the over 3,000 U.S. counties for 14 U.S. presidential elections (1948–2000)—the most exhaustive empirical test of the weather-turnout thesis to date… In the end, we find that bad weather (rain and snow) significantly decreases the level of voter turnout within a county. We also demonstrate that poor weather conditions are positively related to Republican party vote share in presidential elections.

In particular, the results of their impressive analysis reveal that Republican presidential candidates added about 2.5% to their vote share for every one inch of rainfall above normal.  Now the usual caveats about generalizability apply, but if we extend this effect to ideology (rather party identification) and primary elections (rather than general elections), it seems reasonable to me that bad weather will suppress turnout among Mitt Romney voters.  The logic is that ideologically extreme primary voters are more likely to cast their ballot despite inclement weather compared ideologically moderate primary voters.

Now if this logic holds then, yes, rain in Iowa may help Ron Paul’s chances as Mike Huckabee claimed (of course it may help Gingrich for the same reasons).  But does this mean that rain will be the deciding factor between a Ron Paul victory and a Mitt Romney victory?  I’m skeptical for two reasons.  First, though the most recent polling shows Gingrich, Romney and Paul in a statistical tie, my intuition is that the effect of rainfall in primary elections (even significant rainfall) is lower than that reported by Gomez, Hansford and Krause’s analysis (2.5% in their study of general elections).  Primary voters are, after all, more ideological and (I’m assuming) more motivated to turn out despite inclement weather compared to general election voters.  Moreover, a 2003 simulation by Citrin, Schickler and Sides (see an version here) shows that even full turnout rarely sways election outcomes (though there is a Democratic advantage associated with greater turnout).  The second problem is that rain is uncommon in Iowa in January.  According to one not-so-scientific source, the average rainfall Iowa for the entire month of January is only 1.1 inches.  Moreover, an early forecast from Weather.com (left) predicts a whopping 0% chance of rain on Tuesday (and only 10% on the 2nd and 4th).

So could rain affect the Iowa Caucus?  That seems reasonable to me.  But will it affect the outcome?  Unlikely.